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16 July 1955

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Dear Allen:

I believe the recommendation in the Clark Report for an Executive Director contains a lot of political dynamite, inasmuch as both the Doolittle and Clark surveys commented strongly on CIA's organizational weaknesses. I do not believe it is a matter that can be pushed aside by a statement that you have three Deputy Directors each being an "executive" for you over his area of responsibility, inasmuch as both surveys recognized that the DD/P area is neither well organized nor well run.

I would be less than honest if I did not tell you that I agree that the Agency needs an Executive Director. I say this knowing the idea of an Executive Director is repugnant to you on several grounds. General Balmer accurately reflected the working level view that the Agency is loosely run. It is physically impossible for you and the DDCT to work on the high levels of government that your positions require; participate in a multitude of inter-Agency meetings; decide Agency policy; interest yourself in major operations; be the President's Chief intelligence officer; see people from the outside--to mention only a few of the things you do--and still see that the Agency runs properly. As one of your subordinates over a long period of time, I believe you are doing yourself a disservice by trying to run the organization without an Executive Director.

I have the distinct impression that one of the reasons why you dislike the idea is that the term "Chief of Staff" is also used. But I would point out that there are few private business concerns that do not have either a Managing Director or an Executive Vice President.

Further, you probably feel that the creation of an Executive Director would push you away from actual operations, would come between you and your Deputies, would tend to place you in an ivory tower. None of these would have to be true with the right man in the job, because a good Executive Director should observe your methods of working and adjust his work accordingly. His main impact on your job would be to see that: 1) you were kept thoroughly and promptly advised of all Agency activities; 2) that those matters requiring your decision were brought to your attention; 3) that your time is sufficiently available to the three Deputies to give them necessary policy for implementation; 4) that there was complete and definite follow-up on all decisions made by you.

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The statement that each of the Deputy Director is an "executive" over his own area is subject to considerable question. It would be one thing if each of the Deputies were an able executive devoting himself exclusively to the management of his components. It would also be a factor if the areas of the three Deputies were mutually exclusive and compartmented. But despite necessary security compartmentation and operation on a need to know basis, the CIA is a highly interrelated organization, viz: Training, Communications, Personnel, Logistics, Comptroller, etc., serve the entire Agency; the DD/I area provides intelligence support for the DD/P; [redacted]

[redacted] career service is supposed to cover the entire Agency and prescribes rotation of personnel between components. These are only a few of the interrelationships. The smooth working depends exclusively on the good will of the Deputies. The only court of appeal is to yourself or the DDCI. The absence of an Executive Director to do the pick and shovel work for you perpetuates intra-Agency difficulties.

I believe I need only to cite what I regard as the rather cavalier treatment of the major Doolittle recommendations as an example of needed executive direction. I do not feel that the Agency could weather a careful scrutiny by the Doolittle Study Group of what action has been taken on their recommendations.

Obviously I would not be foolish enough to say that the appointment of an Executive Director would provide a panacea for all the Agency ills. Such an individual would have to have your unqualified support. But I would not be doing my duty as your Inspector General--nor would I be honest with you as a friend--if I did not identify for you this need within the CIA. It would be a national disaster if anything happened to break up this Agency, reduce its stature, or curtail its authority. Yet I feel that this is all possible if drastic action is not taken.

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Sincerely,

[redacted]
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

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